The cognitive approach in science and the problem of historicity: Characterization from the concepts
Abstract
The cognitive approach has difficulties dealing with the problem of his-toricity. This is relevant because historicity is related to three successive levels: science, agents and the reality itself researched (above all, social and artificial). When the problem of historicity is seen from the viewpo-int of concepts, the key aspect is the possibility of stating the existence of a historicity in the cognitive content and, at the same time, that the historical character –in any of the three levels pointed out– is not in-compatible with objectivity.Initially, the paper considers the context of the problem of historicity in the realm of the cognitive approach. This connects with issues on the specificity of the content and the role of the cognitive subject. Thereafter, the analysis goes more deeply into the question of how to understand the change of the cognitive content. This task is developed here through reflection on the conceptual revolutions in science. Later, the attention shifts to the role of concepts, insofar as they are the nexus with what is historicallly concrete, because researchers use concepts to make something real that changes intelligible. Finally, there are several considerations on the perspectives of the authors analyzed here in order to evaluate their contributions.Downloads
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References
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