Prelminary considerations to a theory of truth
Abstract
On the basis of considering truth to be a property, the author holds that it is preached by propositions, beliefs, statements and prayers, in the corresponding hierarchical order. Likewise, he presents an outline of three theories of the proposition, and concludes that it is indifferent to declare oneself in favor of any of them, since all of them consider propositions as privileged entities with respect to the attribution of the 'true' predicate. Finally, he argues that a problem as complex as the elaboration of a theory of truth is that of a theory of propositions.Downloads
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References
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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